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This paper examines the implications of recent research on monetary policy rules for
practical monetary policy making, with special emphasis on strategies for setting interest
rates by the new European Central Bank (ECB).  The paper draws on recent research and
new simulations of a large open economy model to assess the efficiency of a simple
benchmark rule in comparison with other proposed rules. The paper stresses new results
on the robustness of monetary policy rules in which each rule that is optimal or good
according  to one model or researcher is tested for robustness by other researchers using
different models.  Because of the large increase in the number of economists focussing on
econometric evaluation of monetary policy rules for the interest rate instrument and
because of the parallel increase in the variety of models being developed for this purpose,
much more evidence is becoming available on the robustness of simple monetary policy
rules for the interest rate than ever before.
Prepared for the Monetary Policy Rules Conference sponsored by the Sveriges Riksbank
and the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 12 and 13, 1998.  I am grateful to Ronald McKinnon and Akila Weerapana
for helpful comments and assistance.  This research was supported by the Stanford
University Center for Economic Policy Research.2
Research on monetary policy rules has mushroomed since the early 1990s and is
now being conducted at many universities, central banks, research institutes, and private
financial firms.  In a relatively short span of time, an enormous amount of information
has been generated by this research effort.  This heightened interest in policy evaluation
has enabled researchers to examine the robustness of proposed policy rules with much
more depth and rigor than ever before.  By carefully studying the empirical evidence, the
computer simulations, and the theoretical calculations in this research, I believe one can
find much that is helpful for improving policy in the future, or, at least, for maintaining
the good monetary policy performance experienced in many countries in recent years.  In
this paper I make a start at examining the results of this recent research.  In order to focus
on some of the practical concerns of policy makers, I consider the implications of the
results for interest rate decisions at the European Central Bank.  To do so, I perform some
new simulations of a large open economy model that includes the three largest countries
in the European Monetary Union (EMU).
Economists conducting research on monetary policy rules take as given that
central banks should have a goal, or target, for the rate of inflation.  The target may be
explicit as in Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the U.K. or implicit as in the United
States or Germany; the target may be a range of inflation rates or an average inflation rate
over a period of time.  Most economic researchers also take as given that the central bank
should endeavor to keep inflation close to the target through the guidance of a monetary
policy rule, or perhaps a portfolio of such rules, in which their instrument of policy—
most always the short-term interest rate—is adjusted in response to developments in the3
economy.  The key question posed in this research is: what type of monetary policy rule
should the central bank use to guide its decisions, and, in particular, how responsive, if
responsive at all, should the central bank’s interest rate decisions be to real output, the
exchange rate, the lagged interest rate, and the inflation rate itself?   The degree to which
the actual inflation rate fluctuates around the target is a key measure of performance used
in these studies, but it is not the only performance measure: fluctuations in real output,
employment, the interest rate, and unanticipated inflation are also given weight in the
objective functions. The recent research has included historical studies of individual
countries, cross-section studies comparing different countries, time-series econometric
studies, and impressive advances in theoretical modeling.
1
Much of this research has focussed on whether a simple benchmark monetary
policy rule for the interest rate, such as the one I proposed several years ago (Taylor
1993a) as a guide for the Federal Reserve’s decisions about the federal funds rate, could
be usefully amended or altered in order to improve economic performance.
2   For
example, would an interest rate response to the forecast of the inflation rate work better
than an interest rate response to the actual inflation rate and to real output separately as in
the benchmark rule?  Should the interest rate respond to actual inflation or real output by
a larger or smaller amount than the benchmark rule?  Or would responding to the
                                         
1 New research on theoretical models of staggered wage and price setting has
closely paralleled the recent research on monetary policy rules because price and wage
rigidities are the source of short-run monetary neutrality in the models used for
evaluating alternative policy rules.  A brief  review of the recent work on price and wage
rigidities in macroeconomics is provided in Taylor (1998a).
2  To the degree that research in the late 1990s is looking to more complex rules
with more variables than simple benchmark rules, it contrasts with the research in the4
exchange rate or to the lagged interest rate as well as to real output and inflation improve
economic performance?
I have been struck by several of the empirical findings and model simulation
results.   There are significant correlations, both over time and across countries, between
policy rules for the interest rate and economic performance; these correlations validate
theoretical predictions about how policy should affect performance.  Model simulations
show that simple policy rules work remarkably well in a variety of situations; they seem
to be surprisingly good approximations to fully optimal policy.  Simulation results also
show that simple policy rules are more robust than complex rules across a variety of
models.  Introducing information lags as long as a quarter does not affect the
performance of the policy rules by very much.  Moreover, the basic results about simple
policy rules designed for the United States seem to apply broadly to many countries.
Some of the findings of the research are useful for telling us what we do not
know.  For example, there is uncertainty about how useful it is for central banks to react
to the exchange rate when setting interest rates, or to use a monetary conditions index
which automatically takes exchange rates into account.  Model simulations are not
definitive about the value of a policy that responds to the lagged interest rate, a response
that is sometimes referred to as interest rate smoothing, though the results show that the
term “smoothing” is misleading.  There is also disagreement about whether the interest
rate should respond solely to a measure of expected future inflation, rather than actual
observed values, a response that is sometimes called forward-looking, though the results
                                                                                                                           
early 1990s which tried to simplify the complex policy rules implied by econometric
models with many variables and many lags.5
show that the term “forward-looking rules” connotes a misleading contrast with the
benchmark rules.   And there is still great uncertainty about measuring potential GDP and
the equilibrium real interest rate, though this is a problem for any monetary policy.  Even
in these cases of disagreement, however, the research findings have been helpful in
telling us the reasons for the disagreements and thus pointing out ways to resolve this
uncertainty with further research.  For example, the degree to which a model uses rational
expectations greatly influences whether a policy rule that reacts to lagged interest rates is
a good or bad policy.
1.  A General Framework for Evaluation of Policy Rules
As shown in Table 1, researchers are using many different types of models for
evaluating monetary policy rules, including small estimated or calibrated models with or
without rational expectations, optimizing models with representative agents, and large
econometric models with rational expectations.  Some models are closed economy
models, some are small open economy models, and some are multicountry models.
Monetary policy rules are also being evaluated by policy makers themselves drawing on
their own practical experience using monetary policy rules as inputs to the policy making
process.  Examples of different policy maker’s perspectives on policy rules are also listed
in Table 1.  Of course formal modeling is also usefully supplemented with historical or
comparative analysis across countries.  Seeking robustness of the rules across a wide
range of models, viewpoints, historical periods, and countries is itself an important
objective of policy evaluation research (Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), McCallum
(1998)).6
Despite the differences in the models, there are some important common features.
First, virtually all the models are dynamic and stochastic; the covariance matrix of the
shocks is just as important a parameter in these models as are the interest rate elasticities
or production function parameters. Second, the models are general equilibrium models in
the sense that they describe the behavior of the whole economy, not only one sector of
the economy.  Third, all the models used in this research incorporate some form of
nominal rigidity, usually through some version of staggered wage or price setting.
The following notation provides a general framework for describing the models
and the methods most commonly used for evaluating monetary policy rules.  Consider a
set of dynamic stochastic equations of the form
yt = A(L,g)yt + B(L,g)xt  +  ut ,  (1)
xt = G(L)yt (2)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables (such as the rate of  inflation, real output,
and the exchange rate), xt is the policy variable (the short term interest rate in all the
research discussed in this paper), ut is a serially uncorrelated vector of random variables
with variance-covariance matrix  ,  and A(L,g), B(L,g), and G(L) are matrix or vector
polynomials in the lag operator (L).  The vector g consists of all the parameters in G(L).
Equation (1) is the reduced form solution to the dynamic stochastic rational
expectations model used for the evaluation of a monetary policy rule. Equation (2) is the
monetary policy rule to be considered.  The policy rule is assumed to be known and taken
as given by all households and firms described by the model.  The notation emphasizes7
that A and B depend on the parameters (g) of the policy rule.
3  Substitution of the policy
rule (2) into the reduced form equation (1) results in a vector autoregression in yt and its
lagged values.   From this vector autoregression one can easily find the steady state
stochastic distribution of yt, characterized, for example, by the autocovariance matrix
function or the spectral density of yt.   It is clear that the steady state stochastic
distribution is a function of the parameters (g) of the policy rule along with   and the
other parameters in A and B.  Hence, for any choice of parameters g in the policy rule
one can evaluate any objective function that depends on the steady state distribution of yt.
For example, if the loss function is a weighted average of the variance of inflation and the
variance of real output, then the two diagonal elements of the covariance matrix
corresponding to inflation and real output are all that is needed.  With this method of
evaluation of the loss function, one can compare the performance of different policy
rules—perhaps complex rules versus simple rules—or compute the optimal policy rule by
maximizing the welfare function with respect to the parameters of the policy rule using a
nonlinear optimization algorithm.
Specific examples of models used for policy evaluation work that fit into this
general framework are the simple non-rational expectations models of Ball (1997, 1998)
and Svensson (1997), the time-series econometric model of Rudebusch and Svensson
                                         
3 In the special case where the model is not a rational expectations model (no forward-
looking), equation (1) is simply the model itself.  If there are forward-looking
expectations variables in the model (perhaps through the Euler equations of an optimizing
model), then we assume that these expectations variables have been solved out using a
rational expectations solution method to get the reduced form of the model in (1).  If the
underlying model is nonlinear (as in Taylor (1993b)), then (1) will be nonlinear and yt
will have to be determined with a nonlinear solution algorithm.  In this case we can
interpret (2) as a linear approximation of the solution.8
(1998), the Federal Reserve’s large scale rational expectations econometric model
described by Brayton, Levin, Tryon, and Williams (1997), the small forward-looking
models of Clarida, Gertler, and Gali (1997b), and Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the
multicountry rational expectations model of Taylor (1993b), and the representative agent
optimizing models of Goodfriend and King (1997), McCallum and Nelson (1998),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Svensson (1998), and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(1998).
The Role of Money in Interest Rate Rules
Several important features of most research evaluating monetary policy rules
should be emphasized in the context of equations (1) and (2).  One relates to the role of
money when the central bank uses the interest rate as its instrument in its policy rule as
assumed in all the papers discussed here.  In principle, one of the elements in the vector
equation (1) should be an equation describing money, perhaps through a money demand
equation or perhaps through the first order conditions of an optimization problem with
money in the utility function.  However, if the policy rule in equation (2) describes the
behavior of the interest rate, then the money supply is endogenous because the central
bank must vary the money supply in order to achieve its desired interest rate settings.
The path for the endogenous money supply can be determined from the money equation
in (1).   For example, money is endogenous in the model of McCallum and Nelson (1988)
and in the multicountry model of Taylor (1993b) when the central bank follows an
interest rate rule.  In these models, an increase in the target inflation rate (a shift in the
policy rule for the interest rate) implies that the central bank must eventually increase the9
rate of money growth by the amount that the target inflation rate increases.  Hence, the
path for money growth followed by the central bank in the long run is exactly the rate
that would be followed if money growth were the instrument of policy.  However,
because the change in money growth does not feed back into the model, money growth
need not be computed; indeed, in some models (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998))
money growth is ignored.  But using an interest rate rule does not eliminate the concept
of money demand and money supply; it simply makes money endogenous.
Just as an interest rate rule has implications for the money supply, so does a
money supply rule have implications for the interest rate.  In fact, a fixed money growth
rule will generally imply a reaction of interest rates to the inflation rate and to real output
similar in form though not necessarily similar in size to interest rate policy rules.   In my
view this connection between money supply rules and interest rate rules can be useful in
formulating policy.  When inflation gets very high or negative, interest rate rules lose
their usefulness because expectations of inflation shift around a lot and are hard to
measure. In these circumstances interest rate rules lose their advantages over money
supply rules and can break down completely (see Taylor (1995)). For this reason it is
useful for central banks to keep track of the money supply and perhaps monitor policy
rules for the money supply or monetary base even when they are using interest rate rules
as a guideline.  For example, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank now publishes an
interest rate rule that  I proposed along with a rule for the monetary base developed by
McCallum.
4
                                         
4 See Monetary Trends, January 199810
Institutional Commitment to the Policy Rule
A second important point is that by assuming that the private sector takes the
monetary policy rule (2) as given and by assuming that this policy rule is followed
consistently by the central bank, most econometric policy evaluation researchers
implicitly assume that the dynamic inconsistency problem is solved by some appropriate
institutional design which takes incentives and politics into account.  In other words, the
implicit assumption is that the central bank is committed to following the policy rule.  Of
course, a large amount of useful monetary policy research has focussed on issues related
to establishing such a commitment.  But these issues are usually abstracted from in
research on the evaluation of monetary policy rules.  Virtually all of the econometric
work on monetary policy evaluation assumes that the policy makers do not change the
policy rule.
5
A Simple Representative Model
It is helpful to examine a simple model which is both an example of equations (1)
and (2) and representative of the different types of models used in the research on policy
rules.  Consider the following model:
yt = - (it -   t - r) + ut (3)
t =   t-1 +   yt-1 + et (4)
it =  g t + gyyt + g0    (5)
                                         
5 A recent review of the literature on commitment, time inconsistency, and its
implications for the design of monetary policy institutions is provided in Persson and
Tabellini (1998).11
where yt is the percentage deviation of real GDP from potential GDP, it is the short-term
nominal interest rate,  t is the inflation rate, and et and ut are serially uncorrelated
stochastic shocks with a zero mean..  The parameters of the model are  ,  , r (all
positive) and the covariance matrix of the shocks ut and et.  The policy parameters are g ,
gy, and g0.
Observe that equations (3) and (4) together correspond to the vector equation (1)
and that equation (5) corresponds to the policy rule in equation (2). In general  ,  , and r
are reduced form parameters that will depend on the policy parameters g , gy, and g0.  For
example, equation (3) could be the reduced form of an optimizing “IS” curve with future
values of the real interest rates as in the model of McCallum-Nelson (1998) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998); equation (4)—a price adjustment (PA) equation
showing how prices adjust slowly over time—could be the reduced form of a rational
expectations model with staggered wage and price setting, in which expectations of
future wages and prices have been solved out.  If the parameters do not change very
much when the policy parameters change, then treating equations (3) and (4) as policy
invariant—as is done in the models of Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997)—will be a good
approximation.  But if the parameters do change by a large amount in response to policy,
then the changes must be taken into account in the policy evaluation.  Nevertheless, when
viewed as a reduced form, these equations summarize more complex forward-looking
models and are useful for illustrating key points.12
2.  Getting the Sign  Right on the Slope of Aggregate Demand
One of the most important policy implications of recent research on interest rate
rules is actually quite a simple idea.  The research shows that it is crucial to have the
interest rate response coefficient on the inflation rate (or a suitable inflation forecast or
smoothed inflation rate) above a critical “stability threshold” of one.  In fact, a simple
way to characterize the better monetary policy performance in the United States in the
1980s and 1990s compared with the 1960s and 1970s is that this response coefficient
increased from below this stability threshold to above the threshold.  If the European
Central Bank chooses to use the short term interest rates as its instrument, then I believe
that having a response coefficient greater than one will be the first step to achieving good
performance.
The Response of the Interest Rate to Inflation and Macroeconomic Stability
The theoretical basis for this result can be shown graphically using the
representative model in equations (3), (4), and (5).  The two top graphs in Figure 1 show
two different policy rules corresponding to different parameters in equation (5).  These
two rules lead to remarkably different economic performance according to the model.
6
The policy rule in the upper left is stabilizing and the one on the upper right is
destabilizing. To see this, substitute equation (5) into equation (3) to get an aggregate
demand (AD) relationship between   and y.  The slope of this AD relationship is
 - (g  -1)/(1+ gy).
                                         
6 For simplicity we set gy to zero in these diagrams, but the same argument applies if gy is
not zero.13
Clearly the slope of the relationship depends on the parameters of the policy rule. As
shown in the lower panels in Figure 1, the relationship can be graphed in a diagram with
the inflation rate on the vertical axis and real output on the horizontal axis.
The price adjustment (PA) equation (4) can also be graphed in the two lower
panels and is shown as a flat line;  the line is flat because the current inflation rate does
not appear in equation (4).  The PA line will gradually move up when y is greater than
zero and gradually move down when y is less than zero, generating dynamic movements
over time.  A price shock (e) will also shift the price adjustment line, as shown in the
lower panels of Figure 1.
Now consider the two cases in Figure 1.  The dashed line in the upper panels has a
slope of one.  Hence, it is clear that for the rule on the left, g  is greater than one, and for
the rule on the right, g  is less than one.  Observe that the slope of  the aggregate demand
relationship is negative if the response of the interest rate to inflation (g  ) is greater than
one and it is positive if g  is less than one. The case on the left is the stable case because
an upward shift in the price adjustment line (an inflation shock e) results in a decline in y
below zero which brings the inflation rate (and the price adjustment line) back down.
The case on the right is unstable because, with a positively sloped aggregate demand
curve, an upward shock to inflation (e) causes y to rise and tends to increase inflation
further.  This relationship between the stability of inflation and the size of the interest rate
coefficient in the policy rule is a basic prediction of monetary models used for policy
evaluation research.  In fact, because many models are dynamically unstable when g  is
less than one—as illustrated in Figure 1—the simulations of the models usually assume
that g   is greater than one.14
International Comparisons and Historical Evidence.
Before examining these simulations it is useful to ask whether this basic
prediction of the theory is validated by the data.  In fact, several recent cross section and
historical studies do lend support for this result.  The size of the policy parameters differ
over time and across countries and these policy differences translate into differences in
inflation stability much like the simple illustrative model predicts.
Consider Wright’s (1997) recent international comparison study of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.  Wright (1997) first documents that inflation has
been much less stable in the United Kingdom than in Germany and that the United States
has been somewhere in between, but closer to Germany than to the United Kingdom.
Wright’s measure of stability is the degree to which the long run inflation rate in each
county could have been predicted during the 1961 to 1994 period.  In particular, he finds
that the 95 percent confidence interval for the steady state inflation is somewhat larger in
the United States than in Germany, and much larger than in the United Kingdom than in
either Germany or the United States.  Second, Wright estimates the inflation response
coefficient (analogous to g  ), for Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom.
He finds that the relative size of these response coefficients is exactly as predicted by the
theory.
7  “The responses to an inflation shock…appear to confirm prior expectations:
                                         
7 While Wright’s (1997) strong negative correlation between the response coefficients
and inflation stability validates the theory, he also sometimes finds response coefficients
that are near or even somewhat less than one which raises questions about the simple
version of the theory in equations (3) and (4). These findings may be due to the fact that
his sample period includes the late 1960s and 1970s when policy was less aggressive than
it is today, as discussed below.  However, Wright (1997) argues that the nominal interest15
both the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve respond actively to an inflation shock; but
the Bank of England response is, in contrast, minimal. It is noteworthy that the
Bundesbank’s response is much the most rapid and aggressive of the three.” (Wright
(1997), p.19).
Historical analysis of policy rules adds further evidence to the importance of the
interest rate response to inflation.  Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997b), Judd and
Rudebusch (1998), and Taylor (1998) report results showing that the inflation response
coefficient (analogous to g ) was much larger in the 1980s and 1990s in the United States
than it was during the late 1960s and 1970s.  For example, the estimate of g  in Taylor
(1998) is about .8 for the early period and about 1.5 in the later period, nearly twice as
large.  Since the inflation rate was much more stable in the later period than in the earlier
period this result also supports the theory.
8
Implications of the Policy Rule for the Long Run Average Inflation Rate
According to the representative model, the long run steady inflation rate occurs
where y = 0 and is equal to
 = (g0  - r )/(1 - g   ) (6)
which can be interpreted as the target inflation rate implied by the policy rule. By
choosing the intercept in the policy rule, the central bank determines the target inflation
                                                                                                                           
rate may also be a factor in the IS equation (equation (3) in this paper).  If so, then
increases in the interest rate by less than one in response to inflation could still be
stabilizing.  But the more basic point that higher values of g  are associated with more
stable inflation still holds in a model with a role for nominal interest rates in the IS
equation.16
rate.  For example, if the target inflation rate is 2 percent, then the central bank should set
g0 = r + 2(1- g  ). If g  = 1.5 and r = 2 then the intercept should be one.  To determine this
coefficient the central bank needs to estimate the equilibrium interest rate r.
Equation (6) illustrates an important practical problem faced by central bankers
who use the interest rate as an instrument.  It shows that uncertainty about the equilibrium
real interest rate r causes uncertainty about the long run inflation rate.  However,
uncertainty about the real interest rate does not cause an unstable inflation rate.  Rather it
results in a mistake in the level of the long run inflation rate.  Note that the size of the
inflation mistake due to uncertainty about the equilibrium real interest rate depends on
the inflation response coefficient.  Values of  g   close to one imply that mistakes about
the real interest rate will causes big mistakes in the inflation rate; this is another reason to
keep this parameter well above one.
9
3.  The Response to Output and the Lagged Interest Rate: Robustness Results
While keeping the interest rate response to inflation well above the critical
threshold of one is a useful first step in formulating a monetary policy, it is also necessary
to know how large the coefficients on inflation (and output) should be, and whether the
policy makers should take account of the lagged level of the interest rate. Theoretical
calculations are less useful for these questions because the answers depend on the model
                                                                                                                           
8 The response coefficient appears to be even lower in the international gold standard
period (Taylor (1998)) when inflation (at least in the short run) and real output were less
stable.
9 Uncertainty about potential GDP (for example, the central bank may not know the
steady state value of y) will cause similar errors in the long run inflation rate.  As
discussed in Taylor (1996) these errors can grow if the growth rate of potential is
mistaken.17
and the parameters of the model used by the researcher. In fact, there is some
disagreement about the appropriate size of the response because of the differences in the
models.  To explore these issues there is no substitute for examining model simulations
from a number of different models.
Table 2 provides such information about some recent simulation studies.  It shows
the results of five different policy rules simulated in nine different models.  The models
fall into the general framework of equations (1) and (2).  They are dynamic, stochastic,
general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities.  They differ in size, degree of
forward-looking, goodness-of-fit to the data (estimated or calibrated), and whether they
are closed economy, small open economy, or multicountry models . The models are:
10
Ball (1998) Model (B)
Haldane and Batini Model  (HB)
McCallum and Nelson Model (MN)
Rudebusch and Svensson Model (RS)
Rotemberg and Woodford Model (RW)
Fuhrer and Moore Model (FM)
Small Fed Model  (MSR)
Large Fed Model (FRB)
Taylor Multicountry Model (1993b) (TMCM)
Because of the differences among the models they serve as a good robustness test of
policy rules. The five different policy rules simulated in these models are of the form
  it =   it-1  +   g t + gyyt + g0  (7)18
with the coefficients:
   g   gy
Rule I 3.0 0.8 1.0
Rule II 1.2 1.0 1.0
Rule III 1.5 0.5 0.0
Rule IV 1.5 1.0 0.0
Rule V 1.2 .06 1.3
Rules I and II each have a coefficient of one on the lagged interest rate, with Rule
I having a high weight on inflation relative to output and Rule II having a smaller weight
on inflation relative to output.  Because the central bank partially adjusts its interest rate
from the current rate in these two rules, they are sometimes referred to as interest rate
smoothing rules, though they sometimes result in more interest rate volatility than rules
which do not involve partial adjustment.
Rule III is the simple benchmark rule proposed in Taylor (1993a).  Rule IV is a
variant of Rule III with a higher coefficient (1.0 rather than 0.5) on real output; this rule
reflects the suggestions of Ball (1997) and Williams (1998) that the interest rate should
be adjusted more aggressively in response to changes in output.
Rule V is based on a proposal of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998); contrary to
Ball (1997) and Williams (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) propose placing a
very small weight on real output.  Also noteworthy about Rule V is that it places a very
high weight on the lagged interest rate.
The policy rules in Table 2 certainly do not exhaust all possible policy rules even
if we restrict ourselves to the functional form in equation (1).  In fact, it is likely that
                                                                                                                           
10 The results in Table 2 are drawn from papers presented at a conference on monetary
policy rules sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research.19
there is some other policy rule that would do better than any of the other policy rules.
However, the rules in Table 2 do provide several of the kinds of perturbations of the
benchmark rule that different researchers have suggested, and they therefore represent the
degree of disagreement that exists about the most appropriate form for policy rules.
11
The standard deviations of the inflation rate (around the target inflation rate), of
real output, and of the interest rate are reported in Table 1.  These are all steady state
values obtained from the covariance matrix of the endogenous variables as explained in
the discussion of the general framework above.  Several conclusions can be drawn from
the standard deviations in Table 2.
First, in order to assess the improvement in economic performance that could
come from a higher weight on output than in the benchmark rule, compare the benchmark
Rule III with Rule IV which has a higher output coefficient.  It is clear that Rule IV does
not dominate the benchmark Rule III.   For all models, Rule IV gives a lower variance of
output compared with Rule III, which is not surprising with the higher weight on output
in Rule IV.  But for six of the nine models Rule IV gives a higher variance of inflation.
Raising the coefficient on real output from 0.5 to 1.0 represents a movement along the
output-inflation variance tradeoff curve, rather than a movement toward or away from
such a curve.  Averaging across all the models also shows such a tradeoff, though the
increase in the average inflation variability is small compared with the decrease in
average output variability when rule IV replaces rule III.  If we include the variability of
the interest rate in the objective function, then there is even more evidence that rule IV
does not dominate rule III because the variance of the interest rate is higher for rule IV
                                         
11 An important topic for future research is to test the robustness of other proposed rules.20
for all but one model for which we have data (data is missing in one other model).  The
average interest rate variance across models is higher with Rule IV.  To be sure Table 2
does not prove that there is not some other rule with a higher coefficient on real output
(say 0.8) that dominates the benchmark rule.
Second, compare the three rules I, II, and V which respond to the lagged interest
rate (interest rate smoothing rules), with rules III and IV in which the lagged interest rate
does not appear.  Again it is clear that the interest rate smoothing rules do not dominate
the benchmark rule.  Surprisingly, for many models the variance of the interest rate is
higher in the rules which react to the lagged interest rate.  Table 2 also indicates a certain
lack of robustness in the rules with lagged interest rates (at least with these high
coefficients): for a number of models these rules are unstable (shown by an infinite
variance).  The models in which the lagged interest rate rules work most poorly are the
models without rational expectations.   This is due to the reliance of such rules on the
expectations they generate of future policy changes: if inflation does not  come down,
then the interest rate can be expected to move by an even larger amount in the future.
However, in models without rational expectations, such expectation effects are not
relevant.  Rule V, which exploits these expectations effects to the greatest extent with a
lagged interest rate coefficient greater than one, is less robust than the other rules, though
it does very well in the Rotemberg-Woodford models for which it was designed  to do
well.21
Simple Rules Compared  With Complex Rules: Optimality and Robustness
All the rules in Table 2 are relatively simple rules, so the results are not useful for
determining how well simple rules perform compared to complex rules.  However, a
number of researchers, including Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), find that simple rules
perform nearly as well as the optimal rule in their model.  Usually rules with only two
factors—a nominal factor like the inflation rate and a real factor like real GDP—come
very close to the fully optimal rule, which would include every variable in the model.
This finding corresponds to that of business cycle research studies that have found that a
two factor model can explain a large fraction of the business cycle variance.
A related and important result found in the simulations of Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (1998) is that simple rules are more robust across models than more complex
optimal rules.  Focussing on the last four models listed in Table 2, Levin, Wieland and
Williams perform a robustness analysis of simple rules versus optimal rules.  They find
that the fully optimal rules are much less robust.  The optimal rules from one model
perform much worse than the simple rules when simulated in other models.  This result
makes intuitive sense, because in order to do better than a simple rule in one model, the
optimal rule exploits properties of that model that are model-specific.  When the optimal
rule is then tested out in another model those properties are likely to be different and the
optimal rule works poorly.22
Relevance of the Robustness Results for the European Central Bank
Taken literally the simulation results in Table 2 pertain mainly to Federal Reserve
policy, because the researchers focussed on the United States economy and Fed policy.
However,  the general conclusions discussed above might apply nearly as well to the
European Central Bank.  For the multicountry model in Table 2 it is possible to do
simulations of an interest rate rule for the ECB instead of the Fed and I report such
simulations below.  But the results for the smaller models may be relevant for the ECB in
their current form.  For example, for the closed models in which a large fraction of the
parameters are calibrated with standard IS elasticities or utility function parameters rather
than estimated parameters (Ball, Haldane-Batini, McCallum-Nelson,  and Rotemberg-
Woodford), the results would apply nearly as well to an economic region similar in size
to the United States.  With little information about the nature of wage and price setting in
a single currency, I suspect that EMU versions of these models would be calibrated in a
way similar to how they are calibrated now.
For the estimated time-series models such as Rudebusch-Svensson, the estimates
would of course be different with EMU data.  To give a feel for the magnitude of the
differences, Table 3 reports estimates of the Rudebusch-Svensson model where real GDP
and inflation are computed from an aggregate of Germany, France, and Italy during the
years 1971.1 through 1994.4 with output detrended with a HP filter.  The general form of
the Rudebusch-Svensson model works remarkably well for this particular European
aggregate.  Using the same number of lags as in the United States there is virtually no
serial correlation in the European model, and the coefficient on output in the inflation
equation is very similar in magnitude.  The main difference is in the size of the short run23
real interest rate elasticity term in the IS equation and the small size of the estimated IS
shocks for the German, French, and Italian aggregate.  Although only a rough estimate of
the behavior to be expected in the future, these results suggest that simulation results
from the United States for the Fed are relevant for the ECB. (Weymark (1997) shows that
this type of model fits well in France, Germany, and Italy individually using annual data.)
Table 4 presents simulations of the benchmark monetary policy rule for the ECB
using the estimates in Table 3 and compares them with the simulations from the
Rudebusch-Svensson model.  The resulting variability of inflation, output, and the
interest rate is less in the EMU than in the United States.    This provides some
preliminary evidence that a rule as simple as the benchmark rule proposed as a guideline
for the Fed would also provide a useful guideline for the ECB.
4. Simulating ECB Interest Rate Rules in a Dynamic Stochastic Multicountry Model
To answer more detailed questions about ECB policy, it is necessary to use an
open economy model with exchange rates and interest rate links between countries. For
this purpose I use a large open economy, rational expectations, econometric model
developed explicitly for evaluating policy rules (Taylor (1993b).  The model includes
seven large countries: France, Italy, Germany, the U.K., Japan, Canada, and the United
States.  It is a dynamic stochastic model with an estimated variance-covariance matrix for
use in stochastic simulations.  The model has detailed descriptions of wage and price
rigidities in each country, which are based on simpler staggered wage and price setting
models.24
To simulate the model for ECB interest rate policy, I assume that exchange rates
between France, Italy, and Germany are fixed permanently and that there is a single short
term Euro interest rate.  I call this Euro interest rate the ECB interest rate and assume that
it can be set in the short run by ECB open market operations in Euro denominated bonds.
I also assume that exchange rates between the Euro and the U.S. Dollar, the Yen and the
Canadian dollar are perfectly flexible.  I have not respecified the wage and price
equations of France, Italy, and Germany to capture the effects of a single currency, but
that would be a feasible future research project with this model.
Figure 2 shows the impact of a single fiscal shock in Germany for two different
policy rules for the ECB.  For both rules the Euro interest rate is increased or decreased
according to the simple benchmark rule proposed in Taylor (1993a).  In Rule G inflation
and real output in the rule are measured by German inflation and output; that is,
i = 1.5 GER +.5yGER   (Rule G)
while in Rule E they are measured by a weighted average of inflation and output in
Germany, France, and Italy.
12   That is,
i = 1.5 EMU +.5yEMU (Rule E)
                                         
12 Wieland (1996) reports similar results using the same model and a different policy rule,
including the U.K in the Euro.  Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) report some
Federal Reserve Board simulations.25
For the single fiscal shock the more symmetric Rule E results in a smaller effect in
France and Italy than the policy Rule G that reacts only to German variables.  However,
the effect of the shock in Germany with Rule E is larger. To the extent that the ECB
decisions entail a greater focus on European aggregates than in the past, this kind of
sharing of the effect of shocks throughout the region seems inevitable.
Stochastic simulations give a better estimate of the overall difference between
Rule G and Rule E, because in fact the European economy is subject to many shocks in
additional to fiscal shocks.  The stochastic simulations indicate a similar sharing of the
impact of shocks, though the total effect is fairly small.  The effect of switching from
German inflation and output to EMU inflation and output in the ECB policy rule is
relatively small on output fluctuations in Germany.  The size of output fluctuations
around trend go up in Germany by 13 percent (a 1 percent fall in real GDP would become
a 1.13 percent fall), and they go down in France by 11 percent, and down in Italy by 16
percent.  Importantly, the change from Rule G to Rule E has virtually no effect on
German inflation and improves inflation performance in France and Italy.
 Role of the Exchange Rate
Ball (1998) found that adding the exchange rate to the benchmark policy rule
could improve macroeconomic performance somewhat in a small open economy model.
The exchange rate is added to the policy rule in two ways in Ball’s analysis: First the
central bank uses a monetary conditions index (MCI) in place of the interest rate as its
instrument.   (An MCI is a weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate; for
Ball the weight on the interest rate is .7 and the weight on the exchange rate is .3).26
Second, the lagged exchange rate is added as a variable to the policy rule.  The net effect
of these two changes is to add the current and lagged exchange rate to the right hand side
of the policy rule. Ball found that, for the same amount of inflation variability, output
variability could be reduced by 17 percent (that is, a 1 percent temporary fluctuation in
output around potential would become a 1.17 percent fluctuation) by adding the exchange
rate to the policy rule in this way.  Because many of the models in Table 2 are closed
economy models, there are no robustness results available for this type of policy rule.
To examine the effects of this type of policy rule for the ECB I simulate a policy
rule for the ECB interest rate with the exchange rate as well as output and inflation in the
multicountry model.  Table 5 uses stochastic simulations of the multicountry model to
compare the benchmark rule (i = 1.5 EMU + .5yEMU) with the rule
i = 1.5 EMU + .5yEMU - 0.25e + 0.15e(-1)
where here the variable e is the U.S. Dollar-Euro exchange rate.  This is the type of
policy rule proposed by Ball (1998). Table 5 shows no clear advantages for such a rule
for the ECB.  The variability of inflation goes down very slightly in Germany, France,
and  Italy, but the variability of output rises by a large amount in Germany (33 percent)
and Italy (25 percent).  Hence, simulations of the multicountry model yield much
different results than simulations of the small open economy model used by Ball (1998).27
Role of the Forecast of Inflation
Haldane and Batini (1998) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) considered the
effects of policy rules in which the central bank adjusts its interest rate in response to
forecasts of future inflation rather than to current inflation and real output.  Sometimes
these rules are called forward looking rules because the forecast of inflation is used rather
than the actual inflation.  But in reality, forward-looking rules are based on current and/or
lagged data because forecasts of the future are based on current and lagged data. Hence,
inflation forecast rules are no more forward looking than rules that explicitly react to
current and/or lagged variables.
The potential advantage of forecasting rules over simple benchmark rules such as
the one proposed in Taylor (1993a), is that they incorporate other variables besides output
and inflation that might be relevant for the forecast. Rudebusch and Svensson (1998)
show that there are several variants on inflation forecasting rules including different
forecast horizons, different response coefficients, and different reactions to lagged
interest rates.   Both Haldane and Batini (1998) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) find
in their models that performance can be improved relative to other simple benchmark
rules if one uses forecast rules.  However, the improvement in performance is fairly small
according to the simulations.  For example,  using a forecast inflation rule with a forecast
horizon of 6 quarters, the standard deviation of inflation is 1.3 percent rather than 1.4
percent with the benchmark rule and the standard deviation of output is 0.9 percent rather
than 1.1 percent according the Haldane-Batini calculations.
How do these results stand up when applied to ECB interest rate setting using the
Taylor multicountry model?  Table 5 compares the benchmark rule (i = 1.5 EMU +28
.5yEMU) with the following inflation forecast rule considered by Haldane and Batini
(1998):
i = 0.32i(-1) + 2.62Et (+8) (Inflation forecast rule)
Table 5 shows that using this rule in the EMU would raise the variability in German and
France compared with the benchmark rule and improve performance in Italy.  Hence, the
forecast inflation rule does not dominate the benchmark rule according to this
multicountry model.
8. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of  this paper has been to summarize, analyze, and supplement with
new simulation results, where necessary, recent research on the evaluation of monetary
policy rules.  The underlying aim has been to draw implications for interest rate setting at
the European Central Bank.  The new simulation results came mainly from simulating
different interest rate rules for the ECB in a seven-country large open economy model, in
which France, Italy, and Germany are inside the EMU, and the United Kingdom is
outside the EMU with Canada, Japan and the United States. Drawing implications for
such a new and crucial policy institution as the ECB from the stochastic simulations of
econometric models may seem to reflect a great amount of hubris, but framing the
discussion of the results in this practical way makes the results more useful than they
otherwise would be.   At the least, the approach is useful for helping to find good
research topics constructive for developing a monetary policy strategy at the ECB in the29
months ahead.   To be sure, there is much more research to do.  Most important in my
view are more extensive robustness testing of simple rules and modeling how the move to
a single currency will change the wage and price determination equations in the
multicountry model used for simulations in this paper.
To summarize, the research reported here shows the surprising efficiency and
robustness of simple policy rules in which the reaction of the interest rate to inflation is
above a critical threshold.  The analysis also shows that the estimated gains reported in
some research from following alternative rules are not robust to the variety of models
considered in this paper.  It appears that the simple benchmark rule I proposed in 1992,
perhaps with some adjustment of the response coefficients, would be worth using as a
guideline for the ECB.  In this respect the remarks of Federal Reserve Governors in the
papers listed in Table 1 would be particularly relevant.  However, because of the
uncertainty about the appropriate size of some of the coefficients in the benchmark policy
rule and because the structure of the economies (especially in wage-price determination)
of the EMU will change in unknown ways as a result of the formation of a single
currency, it is wise to have a portfolio of rules to supplement the benchmark rule.   Such a
portfolio would include rules with higher and lower coefficients on output as well as
lagged variables. In fact, in proposing a benchmark policy rule in 1992 I suggested that
this rule be used in conjunction with a portfolio of  other policy rules.  The idea was to
learn by using policy rules, and this learning process could benefit from the same type
robustness analysis as is currently benefiting econometric policy evaluation research
itself.30
Table 1.  Testing Grounds for Robustness: Recent Econometric Policy Evaluation
Research where the Interest Rate is the Instrument in the Policy Rule
Small Estimated or Calibrated Models without Rational Expectations
Ball (1997)
Ball (1998)
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998)
Svensson (1997)
Small Estimated or Calibrated Models with Rational Expectations
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1997b)
Fuhrer and Madigan (1997)
Haldane and Batini (1998)
Orphanides and Wieland (1997)
Optimizing Models with Representative Agents
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998)
Goodfriend and King (1997)
King and Wolman (1998)
McCallum and Nelson (1998)
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)
Svensson (1998)
Large Econometric Models with Rational Expectations
Brayton, Levin, Tryon, and Williams (1997)
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1998)
Taylor (1995)
Williams (1997)
Historical or International Comparisons
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1997a)
Judd and Trehan (1995)
Judd and Rudebusch (1998)
Orphanides (1997)
Taylor (1998)
Thumann, Alzola, and Monissen (1998)
Weymark (1997
Wright (1998)






Table 2. Robustness Results for Alternative Interest Rate Rules
Standard Deviation of:
Inflation Output  Interest Rate
Rule I
B 2.27 23.06 --
HB 0.94 1.84 1.79
MN 1.09 1.03 5.14
RS
RW 0.81 2.69 2.50
FM 1.60 5.15 15.39
MSR 0.29 1.07 1.40
FRB 1.37 2.77 7.11
TMCM 1.68 2.70 6.72
Rule II
B 2.56 2.10 --
HB 1.56 0.86 0.99
MN 1.19 1.08 4.41
RS
RW 1.35 1.65 2.53
FM 2.17 2.85 8.61
MSR 0.44 0.64 1.35
FRB 1.56 1.62 4.84
TMCM 1.79  1.95 5.03
Rule III
B 1.85 1.62 --
HB 1.38 1.05 0.55
MN 1.96 1.12 3.94
RS 3.46 2.25 4.94
RW 2.71 1.97 4.14
FM 2.63 2.68 3.57
MSR 0.70 0.99 1.01
FRB 1.86 2.92 2.51
TMCM 2.58 2.89 4.00
Average 2.13 1.94 2.82
Rule IV
B 2.01 1.36 --
HB 1.46 0.92 0.72
MN 1.93 1.10 3.98
RS 3.52 1.98 4.97
RW 2.60 1.34 4.03
FM 2.84 2.32 3.83
MSR 0.73 0.87 1.19
FRB 2.02 2.21 3.16
TMCM 2.36 2.55 4.35




MN 1.31 1.12 2.10
RS
RW 0.62 3.67 1.37
FM 7.13 21.2 27.2
MSR 0.41 1.95 1.31
FRB 1.55 6.32 4.67
TMCM 2.06 4.31 4.24
Note: See the discussion around equation (7) of the text for identification of acronyms
and definitions of the five policy rules.32
Table 3. Comparison of Rudebusch-Svensson Inflation-Output Equations:
US and EMU
Inflation Equation ( ): (-1)    (-2) (-3) (-4) y(-1) u DW
US .70 -.10 .28 .12 .14 1.01 1.99
EMU .70  .06 .05 .05 .11 1.37 1.99
Output Equation (y): y(-1) y(-2)   r(-1) v DW
US 1.16 -.25 -.10 .82 2.05
EMU 1.25 -.42 -.02 .53 2.19
Note: The estimated equations for the United States are from Rudebusch and Svensson
(1998) for the sample period 1961.1 to 1996.2.  The estimates for the “EMU” are based
on a weighted GDP and inflation for an aggregate of Germany, France, and Italy for the
sample period 1971.1 to 1994.4.
Table 4. Simple Benchmark Rule Parameters and Resulting Inflation and Output
Performance based on Rudebusch-Svensson Equations in Table 3: US versus EMU.
g gy y i
US 1.50 .50 3.58 2.47 5.16
EMU 1.50 .50 2.98 1.21 4.5533
Table 5. Stochastic Simulations Comparing Three Alternative Monetary Policy
Rules for the ECB Interest Rate Using a Multicountry Model
Germany France  Italy
y y y
(1) Benchmark Policy Rule for EMU 2.05 2.12 2.74 3.97 5.10 2.99
(i = 1.5 EMU + .5yEMU)
(2) EMU Inflation Forecast Policy Rule 2.27 3.83 2.76 4.73 4.57 2.34
(i = 0.32i(-1) + 2.62Et (+8))
(3) Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate 2.00 2.82 2.70 3.72 5.09 3.72
Added to Benchmark Rule
(i = 1.5 EMU + .5yEMU
- 0.25e + 0.15e(-1))34
i i
y y
Stable Case Unstable Case
Figure 1.  Illustration of Stable versus Unstable Monetary Policy
Rules.  On the left the slope of the policy rule is greater than one
and aggregate demand is negatively sloped, causing y to fall
following an inflation shock, which is stabilizing.  On the right the
slope of the policy rule is less than one and aggregate demand is







Figure 2. Effect of a Fiscal Shock in Germany (20 quarters). Rule 1 (solid): ECB interest
rate reacts to German variables. Rule 2 (dashed): ECB interest rate reacts  EMU variables.36
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